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INTRODUCTION

'Without some supervision ... disputes are won not by justice but by
strength. Although imperfect by any standard, the centuries'
accretion of marriage laws are, today, society's painstakingly
hammered consensus on how a couple should justly be treated."
-E.J. Graff, What is MarriageFor? 1
In 1865, the Civil War ended in Virginia; in 2006, the Civil Union
War in Virginia met with a similar fate. On November 7, 2006, the
Commonwealth of Virginia amended its constitution with, among
other things, the following provision:2
This Commonwealth and its political subdivisions shall not
create or recognize a legal status for relationships of unmarried
individuals that intends to approximate the design, qualities,
significance, or effects of marriage. Nor shall this Commonwealth or its political subdivisions create or recognize another
union, partnership, or other legal status to which is assigned the
rights, benefits, obligations, qualities, or effects of marriage.3
The amendment is sweeping, to say the least. Not only does it
prohibit the legal recognition of same-sex marriage and civil unions,
it denies legal status to any couples involved in long-term nonmarital cohabitation. Upon its passage, the amendment's supporters
declared that the people of Virginia had spoken, and the message
was clear: leave marriage alone. 4
Such a sentiment is understandable. Marriage is the foundational
economic, social, and religious unit in American culture. The U.S.
Supreme Court has declared that "[m]arriage is one of the 'basic
civil rights of man,' fundamental to our very existence and

1. E.J. GRAFF, WHAT IS MARRIAGE FOR? 212 (1999).
2. See Chris L. Jenkins, Ban on Same-Sex Unions Added to Va. Constitution,WASH.
POST, Nov. 8, 2006, at A46.
3. VA. CONST. art. I, § 15-A. This amendment also defines marriage as "only a union
between one man and one woman," foreclosing legal recognition of any form of same-sex
union. Id.
4. Jenkins, supra note 2.
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survival. 5 Marriage is of such significance that the Court has
permitted extensive regulation of the institution under the state's
police power.6 The state's interests in marriage are varied and
substantial and include "keeping records, promoting health, and
preventing child or incestuous marriages," as well as providing a
safe, healthy, and nurturing environment for children and families;
facilitating private networks of mutual support and obligation; and
supporting public morality.7 Married people live longer,' make more
money, 9 have better-adjusted children, 10 and have a higher level of
"subjective well-being"" than their nonmarried counterparts. In this
way marriage is an important and beneficial institution for both
couples and for society at large. Virginia's conclusion that it wants
to protect the working model for such a successful, socially valuable,
time-proven entity is hardly front page news. 2
From the standpoint of a state that clearly has articulated a
public policy in favor of marriage, then, the relevant problem is not
that too many people want to enter into marriage; rather, the
problem is that Virginia is full of couples who cohabit but are not
married. 3 According to the most recent U.S. Census estimate,
there were a minimum of 128,363 unmarried-partner households

5. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 527,
535 (1942)).
6. See id. at 7 (citing Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888)). Although Loving struck down
as unconstitutional a Virginia statue that prohibited interracial marriage, the Court noted
that the State could regulate marriage under its police power.
7. David S. Caudill, Legal Recognition of UnmarriedCohabitation:A Proposalto Update
and Reconsider Common-law Marriage,49 TENN. L. REV. 537, 558 (1982).
8. See LINDA J. WAITE & MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE 47 (2000)
("Compared to married people, the nonmarried ... have higher rates of mortality than the
married: about 50% higher among women and about 240% higher among men." (citation
omitted)).
9. See id. at 97 ("Married couples are far more affluent, on average, than singles.").
10. See id. at 38 ("Children living with cohabiting couples show poorer emotional
development than children from married, two-parent families do." (citation omitted)).
11. Id. at 73 ("[The married have the highest level of subjective well-being .... " (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted)).
12. Apparently the Washington Post agrees, as it reported the news of the amendment's
passage on page A46. Jenkins, supra note 2.
13. From this standpoint, the first part of Virginia's constitutional amendment, which
limits accessibility to marriage, does not logically follow from a clear policy preference in favor
of state-regulated marriage. See VA. CONST. art. I, § 15-A. For further discussion of the
implications of this Note for same-sex marriage, see infra Part III.E.
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in Virginia. 14 This translates to over 256,000 Virginians living in
nonmarital cohabitation as of 2006. Statistics show that "[a]bout
half of Americans from age thirty-five to thirty-nine have cohabited"
at some point.1 5 If the aim of the new amendment to the Virginia
Constitution is to encourage unmarried cohabiters to marry because
they cannot hope to receive legal recognition for their less-thanmarriage-but-more-than-just-dating relationships, then the new
amendment may have some limited effect. Increased social acceptance of cohabitation and a general aversion to marital commitment
among cohabiters, 6 however, will strongly militate against that
rather indirect incentive.
This Note will argue that, in furtherance of its legitimate interest
in regulating marriage, Virginia should adopt a form of common law
marriage by estoppel known as "constructive marriage." 7 Because
the extensive data on the benefits of marriage are available almost
exclusively for male-female couples, and, more significantly, because
same-sex marriage is now affirmatively banned by the Virginia
Constitution, this Note will largely focus on heterosexual cohabitation and marriage." Part I will explain why nonmarital cohabitation
should be strongly disfavored as a matter of policy. Part II will
suggest that adoption of the doctrine of constructive marriage would
be a timely, practical, and beneficial public policy for both the people
14. U.S. Census Bureau, http://factfinder.census.gov/ (under "Fast Access to Information,"
select "Virginia" in drop-down menu; then click "show more" next to "Social Characteristics"
on the Virginia page) (last visited Nov. 30, 2007). The estimate is at the low end because the
Census Bureau instructed that couples who were common law married could report in the
category they thought to be "most appropriate." See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN
COMMUNITY SURVEY/PUERTO RICO COMMUNITY SURVEY: 2006 SUBJECT DEFINITIONS 65,
availableat http://www. census .gov/acs/www/Downloads/2006/usedata/Subject Definitions.pdf
(last visited Nov. 30, 2007). Virginia, however, does not recognize common law marriage. See
Offield v. Davis, 40 S.E. 910 (Va. 1902). As a result, unmarried cohabiters who considered
themselves to be common law married, but who were not legally married, could have reported
in any category with which they identified.
15. WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 8, at 37; see also Larry Bumpass & Hsien-Hen Lu,
Trends in Cohabitationand Implications for Children'sFamily Contexts in the United States,
54 POPULATION STUD. 32, tbl. 1 (showing similar rates of cohabitation for women between the
ages of 25-44).
16. See Caudill, supra note 7, at 566.
17. This Note adopts the term "constructive marriage" from Professor David S. Caudill's
article on the subject. See id. at 538-40.
18. A powerful argument could be made that constructive marriage would be as beneficial
for same-sex couples as it has proven to be for heterosexual couples, but that is largely outside
the scope of this Note. See infra Part III.E.
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and the State of Virginia. Part III will explore how constructive
marriage comports with Virginia's constitutional, statutory, and
common law, as well as the explicit and implicit public policy aims
of the Commonwealth.
I. THE STATUS OF COHABITATION AND MARRIAGE
A. Defining Marriage
Everyone has a frame of reference for marriage; it has been
defined, refined, and practiced by American society for hundreds of
years. Marriage is "surrounded by legal, social, and cultural beliefs
about the broad contours of the relationship" that inform the
married and unmarried alike.19 In Virginia, marriage has a simple
statutory definition. By written law, a marriage only requires a man
and a woman to obtain a license and participate in a solemnization
ceremony.2 ° The courts have added to these requirements by
declaring that "sexual intercourse is a necessary act to consummate
any marriage."2 1 Without sex, no marriage exists and the relationship is a legal "nullity. 2 2
The law of marriage in Virginia, however, is more complicated
than the basic entry requirements would suggest. Both statutory
and judge-made law in Virginia focus considerable energy on the
importance of the relationship after the entry requirements of
contract and coitus. A married couple must live in "matrimonial
cohabitation" to be fully engaged in marriage. According to the
Virginia Supreme Court, "'matrimonial cohabitation' consists of
more than sexual relations. It also imports the continuing condition
of living together and carrying out the mutual responsibilities of the
marital relationship. ' 23 The Virginia Code of Domestic Relations
makes clear that matrimonial cohabitation is the relationship's

19. Margaret F. Brinig & Steven L. Nock, Marry Me, Bill: Should CohabitationBe the
(Legal) Default Option?, 64 LA. L. REv. 403, 409 (2004).
20. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-13 (2007) ("Every marriage in this Commonwealth shall be under
a license and solemnized in the manner herein provided.").
21. Derakhshan v. Derakhshan, 42 Va. Cir. 411, 412 (Cir. Ct. 1997).
22. Id.

23. Petachenko v. Petachenko, 350 S.E.2d 600, 602 (Va. 1986); see also VA. CODE ANN.
20-91 (2007) (discussing desertion and failure to cohabit as grounds for divorce).
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essence: willful desertion of one's spouse is a crime;2 4 and abandonment is grounds for divorce for the "innocent party" who has been
deserted.2" Even in the case of no-fault divorce, the husband and
wife must "have lived separate and apart without any cohabitation
and without interruption for one year" in order to break the bonds
of matrimony.2 6 Additionally, matrimonial cohabitation is actually
an affirmative
defense to some grounds for divorce on the theory of
27
condonation.
The law's emphasis on the unwritten requirement of matrimonial
cohabitation means that court inquiries into a marriage will
invariably involve questions about the parties' conduct in the
marriage, rather than being confined to a mere investigation of
whether formal entry requirements were satisfied.2" To that end,
defects in the formal requirements of license or ceremony are not
fatal to a marriage;29 yet a couple's post-wedding conduct-for
example, their failure to engage in matrimonial cohabitation-could
be the undoing of their special legal status as "married."3 °
Marriage, then, from Virginia's perspective, is more than a mere
license, more than a ceremony, and more than just sex. Marriage is
an ongoing filial relationship with mutual responsibilities for the
parties involved.3 1 It is in exchange for this conduct, not the mere
agreement articulated at the wedding ceremony, that the Commonwealth of Virginia truly finds a marriage. In this way, marriage in
Virginia is viewed as a status, not a mere contract.
24. See § 20-61.
25. § 20-91.
26. Id.
27. § 20-94; see also Moran v. Moran, 12 Va. Cir. 340, 346-47 (Cir. Ct. 1988) (denying the
wife's petition for divorce on the grounds of adultery and holding that the wife had condoned
her husband's adultery by continuing to live in a state of "matrimonial cohabitation" with him
after his transgressions).
28. See, e.g., Moran, 12 Va. Cir. at 346-47.
29. See § 20-31 (stating that when a marriage is solemnized by an unauthorized party who
has professed to the couple that she is authorized to conduct a marriage ceremony, or if there
is some defect in the marriage license, the marriage "shall [not] be deemed or adjudged to be
void ... if the marriage be in all other respects lawful, and be consummated with a full belief
on the part of the persons so married, or either of them, that they have been lawfully joined
in marriage").
30. See § 20-91.
31. See Schweider v. Schweider, 415 S.E.2d 135, 137 (Va. 1992).
32. For an excellent discussion on the competing interpretations of marriage as a status
and, alternatively, a contract, see Ellen Kandoian, Cohabitation,Common Law Marriage,and
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As a status, marriage is an institution necessarily subject to close
public regulation. The married couple must conform their behavior
to the status's norms; the individuals involved do not control the
terms of the relationship.3 3 This conforming effect causes the
marital relationship to be actually constructive of the participants'
identities.3 4 By contrast, if marriage were viewed as a mere contract
between two parties, then the parties could define every aspect of
the relationship without regard to the state's interests. 5 Marriage,
as a contract, would be constructive only to the extent that the
parties would be subject to the terms that they privately negotiated,
which they could modify at any time. As a private contract, marriage qua a social institution would lose much of its meaning, as
infinite variations on the parameters of that relationship would
emerge.
Under the marriage-as-status model, conforming conduct is the
relationship's most important aspect. Consider the case of a man
and a woman who privately adopt every aspect of a marriage but
who do not obtain a license or participate in a ceremony. They
cohabit, have children, pool their assets, and divide domestic
responsibilities. They take care of each other at home and present
36
themselves as a solid family unit to their friends and relatives.
Without regard to procedural formalities, objectively they have
entered into the status of marriage. What sense would it make for
a state that views marriage as a status to exclude this man and
woman, who have conformed their conduct to the status, from legal
recognition? Why deny the couple the title, benefits, and legal
sanction of marriage that it affords identically situated couples who
have gone through a solemnization ritual? In the words of one
scholar, "[t]he state simply has little interest in the external
formalities or rituals of a ...
marriage-like relationship. Its concern
is with family stability, care of children, support obligations, and
morality, and each of these values potentially is involved in an

the Possibility of a SharedMoral Life, 75 GEO. L.J. 1829, 1833 (1987).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. (stating that the marriage-as-contract model "would seem to elevate the parties'
roles and obviate the state's role" in regulating marriage).
36. See infra notes 168-71 and accompanying text.
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Denying what could be

....3's

called a "substantive marriage" for a lack of procedural fitness does
not further any of the state's interests in regulating and encouraging the marriage relationship."
The status view of marriage does not require that unmarried
cohabiting couples be denied entry into the institution of marriage;
this is merely the way that Virginia has chosen to regulate the
marital relationship. The state could just as easily recognize and
regulate unlicensed substantive marriages as a status in the same
way and under the same scheme as it regulates fully licensed
marriages.3 9 In doing so, the state would be rewarding statusconforming behavior and discouraging privately negotiated substitutes for marriage. An analogous relationship that is already
treated this way in Virginia is the business partnership.4 ° When
parties enter into a joint business venture, failing to file the
required paperwork does not prevent their relationship from being
recognized and regulated as a partnership, even if the parties did
not have an express oral or written agreement,4 1 and even if the
parties deny that a partnership exists.42
B. IfIt Looks Like a Duck and Walks Like a Duck
If the state were to grant some or all of the privileges of marriage
to a cohabiting but unmarried couple, a threshold question that
must be answered is: What is "nonmarital cohabitation," and at
what point is it sufficiently identical to marriage to be considered as
conforming to the status? In Virginia, longstanding principles of
marriage law have already answered that question: nonmarital
cohabitation exists when a man and a woman "live together in the
same house as married persons ...
or in the manner of husband
and wife."4 3 Virginia courts refer to this status as "cohabitation,
analogous to marriage," and they have "consistently interpreted
37. Caudill, supra note 7, at 569.
38. See supranotes 7-11 and accompanying text.
39. See Cooper v. Spencer, 238 S.E.2d 805, 806-07 (Va. 1977); Kandoian, supra note 32,
at 1868.
40. Kandoian, supranote 32, at 1871.
41. Cooper, 238 S.E.2d at 806-07.
42. Kandoian, supra note 32, at 1871.
43. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 146 S.E. 289, 291 (Va. 1929).
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[nonmarital cohabitation] ...
as encompassing both a permanency or
continuity element and an assumption of marital duties."4 4 Although
the courts have not given couples whose relationships meet this
definition the full title and benefits of legal marriage, by identifying
nonmarital cohabitation they have recognized that these relationships exist and are often substantively the same as legal
marriages.4 5
In practice, identifying cohabitation analogous to marriage can be
difficult. One hallmark of the nonmarital cohabitation relationship
is the lack of regulation by society.4 6 Because of this, "not only do
scholars have difficulty pinning down the meaning of cohabitation,
but (often) so do cohabitors [sic] themselves. 4 7 Unmarried
cohabiters often make the point to the general public that their
relationship is distinctly not marriage. Rather than taking on the
"protective coloration of marriage," unmarried cohabiters in modernsociety sometimes emphasize their unmarried
day American
48
status.
The existence of proud proclamations of unmarried cohabitational
bliss, however, should not result in per se exclusion of a couple's
relationship from regulation in a society that seeks to encourage
and facilitate marriage. These attitudes are exactly those that the
state should be discouraging through regulation.4 9 Such is the
regulatory approach in partnership law: a disavowal of one's joint
venture does not undo the existence of the venture itself; it merely
serves to distract from and obfuscate the relationship's essence.5 °
For the prescriptive aims of this Note, no reason exists to deviate
from the already-adopted and functional definition of nonmarital
cohabitation-or "cohabitation analogous to marriage"-as recognized by the Virginia courts.51 Nonmarital cohabitation therefore
conforms to the status requirements of marriage when: (1) a man
44. Frey v. Frey, 416 S.E.2d 40, 43 (Va. Ct. App. 1992).
45. See id.
46. Brinig & Nock, supranote 19, at 409.
47. Id.
48. WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 8, at 37.
49. See Margaret F. Brinig, Domestic Partnership:Missing the Target?, 4 J.L. & FAM.
STUD. 19, 22-23 (2002).
50. See Cooper v. Spencer, 238 S.E.2d 805, 806 (Va. 1977) (holding that an implied
partnership can be found when specific "indicia of the existence of a partnership"exist).
51. See, e.g., Rickman v. Commonwealth, 535 S.E.2d 187, 190 (Va. Ct. App. 2000).
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and a woman live together with (2) permanency or continuity and
(3) they assume some marital duties.5 2 A couple's declarations about
their nonconformity to procedural formalities would be relevant to
the overall inquiry, of course, but would not be dispositive evidence
of a lack of nonmarital cohabitation.5 3
C. "Let's Just Live Together"
Cohabitations analogous to marriage are unions that approximate
the institution of marriage without the ceremonial formalities or the
social or legal sanction of marriage. Although they are structurally
similar to marriage and conform to the basic requirements of
attaining marital status, nonmarital cohabitations, in practice, fail
to glean the many benefits of marriage for a variety of reasons. In
fact, nonmarital cohabitations come with a host of problems that
exact a toll on both society and the couples involved therein. From
Virginia's policy perspective, the issue is not merely that marriage
should be favored by the state; nonmarital cohabitation as a
separate, unregulated institution should be actively discouraged. In
other words, marriage is not just good, but cohabitation is actually
bad in quantifiable ways.
Couples who cohabit but do not marry tend to be attracted to the
halfway approach of "just living together," because nonmarital
cohabitation is seen as a lesser commitment than marriage, and one
that can be terminated without the hassle and expense of divorce.54
Unsurprisingly, then, one of the primary features of nonmarital
cohabitation is that it is unstable; research has shown that unmarried cohabiters are less committed to each other and that their
relationships are plagued by instability.5 5
This lack of commitment presents problems for the unmarried
cohabiter. Those who try to maintain economic independence run
into problems because they do not experience the economic benefits
that married couples do by fully pooling their resources.5 One result
52. See id. (quoting Frey v. Frey, 416 S.E.2d 40, 43 (Va. Ct. App. 1992)).
53. See Caudill, supra note 7, at 568.
54. See WAITE & GALLAGHER, supranote 8, at 38.
55. Milton C. Regan, Jr., CalibratedCommitment: The Legal Treatment of Marriageand
Cohabitation,76 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1435, 1438 (2001).
56. See WAITE &GALLAGHER, supra note 8, at 39-41.
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of this is that "[niot only do married couples have higher household
incomes than cohabiting couples, but they are less likely to experience various forms of economic hardship, such as having trouble
paying bills. 5 7 Furthermore, cohabiting partners who maintain
economic independence run into difficulties when one partner
makes substantially more money than the other.5 " Although income
disparities are linked to stability in marriages, the same income
disparities in nonmarital cohabitations have a destabilizing effect. 9
Lack of commitment exerts more than an economic toll on
nonmarital cohabitation. Studies show that although married
couples and unmarried cohabiters have nearly identical expectations of sexual exclusivity, ° unmarried cohabiters are much more
likely to be unfaithful to their partners.6 Unmarried, cohabiting
men cheat on their partners four times as often as husbands cheat
on their wives;62 unmarried, cohabiting women cheat on their
partners four to five times as often as wives cheat on their husbands.6 3
Couples who cohabit but do not marry are less likely than
married couples to have children. 4 Increasing numbers of American
children, however, are being raised by unmarried cohabiters, as the
overall rate of nonmarital cohabitation has risen over the past
several decades.6 5 Children born to cohabiting couples are much
more likely to experience family disruption than children born to
married parents,6 6 and the presence of children does not correlate
with an improved relationship quality for unmarried cohabiters.6 7
57. Id. at 41.

58. Id. at 39.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 91 (stating that "[iln the National Sex Survey, 94.6 percent of cohabitors [sic]
and 98.7 percent of married people expected their partner to be sexually faithful to them").
61. See id.
62. See id. (stating that "just 4 percent of married men compared to 16 percent of
cohabiting men said they had been unfaithful over the past year").
63. See id. at 93 (stating that 4 percent of married women had had a secondary sex
partner, compared to 20 percent of cohabiting women).
64. Douglas W. Kmiec, Marriage and Family, in NEVER A MATTER OF INDIFFERENCE:
SUSTAINING VIRTUE IN A FREE REPUBLIC 114, 148 (Peter Berkowitz ed., 2003) (citing WAITE
& GALLAGHER, supranote 8, at 201).
65. See Bumpass & Lu, supranote 15, at 34-35, 34 tbl.4.
66. See id. at 38.
67. See Susan L. Brown & Alan Booth, CohabitationVersus Marriage:A Comparison of
Relationship Quality, 58 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 668, 674 (1996).
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In one study of relationship quality among unmarried cohabiters
and married partners, when the sample of nonmarital cohabitations
was limited to only those that produced a biological child, the data
showed that the presence of a child had no impact on the nexus
between nonmarital cohabitation and lower overall relationship
quality.6" Children raised by unmarried cohabiters also "show
poorer emotional development than children from married, twoparent families."6 9 One unfortunate result of children being raised
by parents who are unmarried cohabiters is that they are more
likely to enter into nonmarital cohabitation arrangements when
they grow up.7 ° Also, due to the likelihood that their parents'
relationship was of lower quality than a marriage, children of
unmarried cohabiters may be themselves more likely to have poor
quality adult relationships, whether in the form of nonmarital
cohabitation or actual marriage.7 1
Couples who live together but do not marry fail to reap some of
the quality of life advantages associated with marriage. The health
benefits of marriage, which include both increased life expectancy7 2
and lower rates of alcoholism in men," are not realized by people
who cohabit but never marry.7 4 Additionally, studies show that
married men actually make more money than single men, but men
who cohabit only realize about half the "earnings premium" that
married men do.75
In summary, marriage is an arrangement that reaps many
benefits for its participants and is associated with positive social
68. Id.
69. WAITE &GALLAGHER, supra note 8,at 38.
70. William G. Axinn & Arland Thornton, The Relationship Between Cohabitationand
Divorce: Selectivity or CausalInfluence?, 29 DEMOGRAPHY 357, 360 (1992).
71. See THOMAS B. HOLMAN, PREMARITAL PREDICTION OF MARITAL QUALITY OR BREAKUP:
RESEARCH, THEORY, AND PRACTICE 99 (2001) (stating that "the quality of family-of-origin
experience assessed premaritally does indeed influence the marital quality of the children
who grew up in those families").
72. WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 8,at 50 ("Almost nine out of ten married men alive
at age forty-eight would still be alive at age sixty-five. By contrast, just six out of every ten
never-married men alive at forty-eight would make it to retirement age ....
").
73. Id. at 53 (stating that one out of four unmarried men between the ages of nineteen and
twenty-six reported that alcohol caused them problems at work or with aggression, compared
to one out of seven married men in the same age range).
74. Id. at 63.
75. Id. at 99-101, 103. Married women also, on average, make more money than single
women. Id. at 105.
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externalities. Nonmarital cohabitation, however, in spite of the fact
that it conforms to the basic structural elements of marriage, fails
to confer many of the quality of life benefits upon its participants,
is far less stable than marriage, and is harmful to children.
D. Which Came First, the Chicken or the Bad Eggs?
All the evidence tending to show the lower quality of nonmarital
cohabitation as compared to marriage begs the question of causality.
Are unmarried cohabiters simply a self-selecting group of those less
likely to get married and more inclined to lead independent, noncommittal lives, or is there something intrinsic in the nature of nonmarital cohabitation itself that leads to instability? Undoubtedly,
the underlying assumptions and proclivities of those who choose to
enter into nonmarital cohabitation are factors in the success of their
relationships; however, this is far from the complete explanation for
the problems with nonmarital cohabitation. Though the extent to
which unmarried cohabiters are a self-selecting group of people who
are bad at relationships may be unclear,7 6 a strong case can be made
that the structure of nonmarital cohabitation is inimical to stability
and long-term success. In other words, doomed couples do not
merely choose nonmarital cohabitation; nonmarital cohabitation can
doom couples.
Nonmarital cohabitation begins to form partners' perceptions
from the moment they move in together. Scholars in the field have
noted that "the early experiences of cohabitation may establish
relationship trajectories that conflict with the expectations of legal
marriage. 7 7 The reason for this is that nonmarital cohabitation is
typically an "exchange relationship" right from the start.7" Exchange
relationships are contractual in nature.7 9 Couples in an exchange
relationship do not have an expectation of permanence, so they
cannot reasonably rely on each other for the mid- and long-term
future. The partners in the relationship, therefore, make decisions
designed to maximize immediate return."0 The result of this
76. Regan, supra note 55, at 1439-42.
77. Brinig & Nock, supra note 19, at 424-25.
78. Id. at 427; see also Brinig, supra note 49, at 22-23.
79. Brinig, supra note 49, at 22-23.
80. Id.
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perpetual short-term focus is indefinitely forestalled intimacy."1
True intimacy can only develop from trust and reliance; with no
external requirement of permanence, participants in an exchange
relationship must forsake uncertain long-term benefits for more
likely short-term satisfaction.82 In marriage, this type of exchange
83
relationship is closely linked with relationship instability.
Nonmarital cohabitation, an arrangement that has no requirement
of permanence, necessitates no commitment, and has no social
sanction to encourage stability, is the exact type of relationship that
lends itself to becoming entrenched in the exchange model.
A second reason the structure of nonmarital cohabitation may be
toxic to its participants is that it exists on a plane outside of public
expectation.8 4 Laws and social norms govern the institution of
marriage and thus the behavior, and even identity, of those who are
married. One scholar has stated that, "[ftor intimate commitment
to be constitutive of identity ... requires that it be seen as something
that derives its value from a source outside the selfs choice to
engage in it. It requires, in other words, social validation." 5 The
formal mechanisms of social validation, however, do not exist for
nonmarital cohabitation." Unmarried cohabiters are not only forced
to construct the terms of their relationships on their own, but,
because no social consensus exists as to how nonmarital cohabitation should be conducted, unmarried cohabiters must also fend for
themselves throughout the course of their relationship. One
researcher has suggested that this social isolation is the primary
cause for the overall lower quality of nonmarital cohabitation as
compared to marriage. 87 Only the strongest of self-constructed and
self-defining unions could survive such isolation, and, indeed, very
few survive at all: 90 percent of nonmarital cohabitations end within
five years.8 8
If nonmarital cohabitation is a bad institution because it fosters
exchange relationships and because it exists apart from social
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

See id.
Id. at 22.
See Brinig & Nock, supranote 19, at 427.
See Brown & Booth, supra note 67, at 670.
Regan, supranote 55, at 1445.
See id.
See Brown & Booth, supranote 67, at 670.
See id. at 669.
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norms and expectations, then one can see how it could be rehabilitated by implementing policies that discourage couples from
focusing on short-term gains and by establishing a set of universal
social norms for nonmarital cohabitation. Such public regulation of
nonmarital cohabitation would promote intimacy in relationships by
giving the partners a set of relationship guidelines; no longer would
they have to indefinitely postpone the decision about whether to
make a mutual commitment because it would become expected at
some point.8 9 In other words, if nonmarital cohabitation were to be
publicly regulated in the same way that marriage is, then the
relationships of those involved would actually become better.
An important consideration in giving legal sanction to nonmarital
cohabitation is that in cases where unmarried cohabiters do
eventually marry, studies show that the couple's likelihood of
divorcing is much higher than if they had never cohabited.9" In light
of this, one criticism of giving social and legal sanction to
nonmarital cohabitation could be that it would ultimately encourage
divorce. This would be an ill-founded criticism. Although marriages
that are preceded by cohabitation are less stable than marriages
that are not preceded by cohabitation, all marriages, regardless
of origin, are more likely to succeed over the long-term than
nonmarital cohabitations alone.9 ' If couples engaged in nonmarital
cohabitation were given the legal sanction, norms, and regulations
of marriage, they would statistically be more likely to stay together
than if they never married.9 2 Additionally, the existence of legal
duties and responsibilities for unmarried cohabiters would have a
deterrent effect on uncommitted couples considering nonmarital
cohabitation.

89. See Brinig, supra note 49, at 28-29.
90. Brown & Booth, supra note 67, at 669 (stating that "marriages in which at least one
spouse is an ex-cohabitor [sic] are 50% more likely to end in divorce than are marriages in
which neither spouse experienced premarital cohabitation").
91. Compare id. with text accompanying note 88.
92. See supra Part I.C; see also Axinn & Thornton, supra note 70, at 372 ("[O]ur work
suggests that cohabitation and divorce may be linked because cohabitation not only is
selective of the divorce-prone but also itself increases susceptibility to divorce.").
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E. When It's Over
Even if regulating nonmarital cohabitation were to have no
positive impact whatsoever on the quality of cohabitation relationships or the individuals involved therein, a separate reason exists
to actively disfavor cohabitation as a matter of public policy: justice.
"The public institution of marriage, in western democracies, is for
applying a just consensus to private disputes, a consensus to treat
each individual bond with respect and equality.""3 The legal
wrangling of divorce can be viewed as an institution of dispute
resolution. When problems arise and couples decide to part ways,
the state has developed a mechanism, in the form of divorce law, to
regulate parties' separations.
The legal remedies that are available to divorcing couples are
unavailable to unmarried cohabiters who separate.94 In Virginia,
divorcing couples have access to the courts, which classify property,
distribute marital property, and determine spousal support payments.95 But an unmarried cohabiting couple-even if involved in a
long-term cohabitation relationship analogous to marriage with
children and jointly held property-would be entitled to no legal
remedies upon the dissolution of their union.9"
The lack of remedies available for separating unmarried
cohabiters has a disparate impact on the people most in need of
aid.97 Less educated, lower income segments of the population are
most likely to be involved in nonmarital cohabitation relationships. 9 Not only are these parties the most in need of support and
assistance, but they are the same populations most likely to
erroneously believe that the state will recognize their nonmarital
union as a common law marriage, placing reliance on a judicial
remedy that is not available to them if they do not live in a common
93. GRAFF, supra note 1, at 214-15.
94. See Cynthia Grant Bowman, A Feminist Proposal To Bring Back Common Law
Marriage,75 OR. L. REV. 709, 758-61 (1996).
95. See Reynolds v. Reynolds, 62 Va. Cir. 114, 122 (Cir. Ct. 2003).
96. Id. Child support actions are separate from divorce proceedings in Virginia, and the
marital status of parents is not a factor in determining child support and visitation rights. See
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-108.1, -124.2 (2007) (pertaining, respectively, to the determination of
child support and to court-ordered custody and visitation arrangements).
97. See Bowman, supra note 94, at 767-70.
98. See Bumpass & Lu, supra note 15, at 32.

2007]

ESTOP IN THE NAME OF LOVE

989

law marriage state.99 In Virginia, the Commonwealth imposes fines
and criminal penalties on "[a]ny spouse who without cause deserts
or willfully neglects or refuses or fails to provide for the support and
maintenance of his or her spouse ...."100 But no sanction is imposed
on an unmarried cohabiter who abandons his or her partner in
equally necessitous circumstances.'
The situation is as bad when a nonmarital cohabitation ends in
the death of one of the partners. In states like Virginia that do not
recognize common law marriage, "[wihen a cohabitation ends with
the death of one of the partners, the survivor as such has no rights
in the decedent's estate."'0 2 An unmarried cohabitant survivor has
no standing to be a plaintiff in a wrongful death suit,'0 3 nor can she
seek Social Security benefits provided for widows and widowers." 4
Dissolutions of nonmarital cohabitation are as emotionally taxing
as divorce 0 5 (and far more common) and are most likely to occur
among the least-educated and poorest citizens, 106 yet currently
Virginia leaves the parties ending a nonmarital relationship to fend
entirely for themselves.
II. REMEDIES
In recognizing the need to provide both legal and social structure
to nonmarital cohabitation, different jurisdictions have come up
with a variety of solutions, both in the United States and abroad.
Many U.S. states, like Virginia, offer few, if any, legal rights of
marriage for unmarried cohabiters.' °7 Other U.S. states and many
western European countries recognize domestic partnerships as a
99. Bowman, supra note 94, at 766. Professor Bowman also points out that nonrecognition
of common law marriage has a disparate impact on minorities and women. Id. at 767-70.
100. See § 20-61.
101. Id. When minor children are involved, a cohabiter who is abandoned by his or her
partner is able to seek both child support and the remedies available under § 20-61. See id.
102. MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW 282 (1989). Glendon
notes, however, that nothing prevents cohabiters from contracting for inheritance through
wills. Id.
103. Id.
104. See Bowman, supranote 94, at 746.
105. WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 8, at 74.
106. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
107. See VA. CONST. art. I, § 15-A (proscribing civil unions in Virginia); Offield v. Davis, 40
S.E. 910, 914 (Va. 1902) (holding that common law marriage is not recognized in Virginia).
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status separate from marriage, and some grant an equitable right
to unmarried cohabiters to seek property distribution.'"° Finally, a
minority of U.S. states fully convert nonmarital cohabitation into
actual marriage under the doctrine of common law marriage.° 9
A. Marvin Remedies
In the famous case of Marvin v. Marvin, the California Supreme
Court held that separating unmarried cohabiters could theoretically
recover property on a theory of quantum meruit. 0 Since the Marvin
ruling in 1976, other states, including Kansas, Mississippi, Washington, and West Virginia, have followed California's lead in holding
that unmarried cohabiters can seek property distribution rights
upon the dissolution of their relationship."'
Although this decision promises some equitable relief, the Marvin
solution to the myriad problems of nonmarital cohabitation is
insufficient. The Marvin remedy is limited to property distribution
rights among unmarried cohabiters who are separating; it does little
to stabilize nonmarital cohabitation." 2 The Marvin approach allows
for marriage and nonmarital cohabitation to exist simultaneously." 3
This situation fails to convey the benefits of marriage to unmarried
cohabiters, because it institutionalizes nonmarital cohabitation as
a kind of second-class marriage that can be privately negotiated.
Marvin and its progeny "fail[] to recognize ...that traditional
marriage-an exclusive status exerting social control-is an

108. See GLENDON, supranote 102, at 278-81 (discussing the California case of Marvin v.
Marvin and its progeny, which recognized that cohabiters could theoretically recover on a
theory of quantum meruit) (citations omitted); see also infra notes 110-21 and accompanying
text.
109. See Sonya C. Garza, Common Law Marriage:A Proposalfor the Revival of a Dying
Doctrine, 40 NEW ENG. L. REv. 541, 541 (2006) (noting that "[tioday, only eleven states and
the District of Columbia recognize common law marriage").
110. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 122-23 (Cal. 1976); see also GLENDON, supra note 102,
at 278-81.
111. See GLENDON, supra note 102, at 281 ("In Kansas, Mississippi, and Washington, the
courts are proceeding, as they do in divorce cases, to distribute the property of cohabitants in
the way that seems to the judge 'just and equitable."' (quoting Marriage of Lindsey, 678 P.2d
328 (Wash. 1984))); Bowman, supra note 94, at 773 (citing West Virginia as a state that has
followed California's Marvin example).
112. See Bowman, supra note 94, at 774.
113. Kandoian, supra note 32, at 1856.
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arrangement that cannot coexist with limitless options."11' 4 Marvin
does not import any of the beneficial social and regulatory features
of marriage into cohabitation." 5 Simultaneously, from the perspective of justice, Marvin is limited because it only grants a quantum
meruit right to property distribution, without providing any of the
other remedies available to widowed or divorcing spouses." 6
B. Domestic Partnerships
A more thorough approach to legalizing nonmarital cohabitation
is in the domestic partnership form. The American Law Institute
(ALI) takes an approach similar to Marvin but allows for more
expansive rights for property distribution when a domestic partnership dissolves.1 7 Under the ALI approach, separating domestic
partners would be able to seek both property distribution
and
18
spousal support in the form of "compensatory payments."'
Like Marvin, however, the ALI approach falls short because it is
limited to dissolution and does nothing to confer benefits upon
unmarried cohabiters during the relationship's course." 9 Marital
obligations of mutual support and fidelity are not imposed upon
domestic partners under the ALI. 2 0 The ALI fails to extend many
of the legal protections of marriage to domestic partnership, such as
tort immunity, spousal confidentiality, and inheritance benefits.' 2 '
As in Marvin, therefore, the ALI approach creates a dual system of
marriage and less-than-marriage, allowing couples to opt out of the
commitment and stability of marriage with a partial solution.
Many western European countries have also recognized varying
forms of domestic partnership.' 2 2 Sweden is perhaps the most
114. Id. at 1857.

115. See supra Part I.C.
116. See Bowman, supra note 94, at 774.
117. See AM. LAW INST. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 6.02(1) (2002).

118. Id. § 6.02 cmt. a; § 6.05 ("Allocation of Domestic-Partnership Property"); § 6.06
("Compensatory Payments").
119. See Brinig, supra note 49, at 29-31.
120. Id. at 31.
121. Id. at 30-31.
122. See Katharina Boele-Woelki, Private International Law Aspects of Registered
Partnershipsand Other Forms of Non-marital Cohabitationin Europe, 60 LA. L. REV. 1053,
1055 (2000).
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progressive of the European countries in that it has removed
virtually all distinctions between statutory marriage and domestic
partnership.'2 3 Sweden now provides the same tax treatment,
insurance schemes, and wrongful death causes of action to both
married and non-married cohabiting couples.12 4 In the event of the
relationship's termination, all couples are offered voluntary
mediation and some property distribution rights, regardless of
marital status.12 5
As the most comprehensive institutionalization of nonmarital
cohabitation, Sweden's approach may provide a model for Virginia;
but, in many ways, it is not a perfect fit. Sweden's solution is
uniquely European because its high tax rate and extensive welfare
system make marital property a much less significant issue for
Swedes than for Americans.' 26 Additionally, when it comes to
inheritance law and property rights for couples with "significant
still has a two-class system for married couples and
assets," Sweden
27
cohabiters.'
The best model for Virginia to emulate in addressing the problem
of unregulated nonmarital cohabitation does not come from Marvin
or the ALI or Europe; rather, it comes in the form of the longstanding American doctrine of common law marriage. As comprehensive
as Sweden's approach may be, "not even Sweden converts cohabitation completely into legal marriage as do the [U.S.] common law
marriage states.' 2 8 Common law marriage offers at once the most
comprehensive and the most American solution for regulating the
relationships of unmarried cohabiters.
C. Common Law Marriage
Common law marriage, as applied in the United States, is
coterminous with marriage.' 29 It is not a substitution for marriage,
it is not a parallel institution to marriage, and it is not a euphemism
123. Bowman, supra note 94, at 777.
124. GLENDON, supra note 102, at 275.

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id.
Id. at 276.
Id.
Id. at 284.
Id.
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for marriage that implies only some of the same legal rights as
marriage. Common law marriage, as a status and an institution, is
one and the same with statutory marriage. The only distinction
between the two is the way in which the marriage begins.13 °
Statutory marriage requires both a marriage license and
solemnization ceremony. 13 By contrast, common law marriage is
formed when a couple assumes marital duties by (1) consummating
their agreement to marry; (2) cohabiting without any formal license
or ceremony; 32 and (3) holding themselves out to the community as
a married couple. 133 In common law marriage states, couples are
free to enter into the marital status via either private agreement (a
law marriage) or public agreement (a license and cerecommon
134
mony).
Common law marriage was extensively recognized in the United
States in the nineteenth century. 35 The rationale behind the
widespread acceptance of common law marriage was founded on a
variety of public policy grounds, ranging from broad concerns about
morality to very practical concerns about social dependency:
By validating informal, common law unions, by refusing to void
marriages formed in violation of statutory requirements,... midand late-nineteenth-century courts advanced a vision of the
marriage relation as an intrinsically desirable end of public
policy. By consistently presuming and preserving the validity of
disputed unions ... American courts in effect legitimized and
provided for children, saved women from unchastity and men
the state against the burden
from licentiousness, and13guarded
6
of financial dependents.
The nineteenth century courts that supported common law unions
137
tended to view marriage as a status and not a mere contract.
Because the marriage status had such significance to the function130. Caudill, supranote 7, at 562-63.
131. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
132. Caudill, supranote 7, at 560.
133. Bowman, supranote 94, at 713.
134. See Matthew J. Lindsay, Reproducinga Fit Citizenry: Dependency, Eugenics,and the
Law of Marriagein the United States, 1860-1920, 23 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 541, 547 (1998).
135. Bowman, supranote 94, at 715.
136. Lindsay, supra note 134.
137. See id. at 546.
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ing of ordered society, and because it was so integrally linked with
rights of property, inheritance, and issues of public morality, the
courts frequently interpreted nonmarital cohabitations as marriages
in an effort to "legitimize" couples and bring them into the fold of
public regulation. 13 So strong was the preference for imputing to
couples the status of marriage that some courts, when disputes
on the party denying the existence
arose, placed the burden of proof
139
of a common law marriage.
As the turn of the twentieth century approached, American
jurisdictions began to renounce common law marriage in favor of
strictly controlled statutory marriage. 4 ° Scholars have suggested a
variety of reasons for the widespread abandonment of common law
marriage, ranging from racism and eugenics to concerns about
poverty and fear of fraudulent claims that might burden the
emerging welfare state."'
The desire to prevent interracial marriage is one factor that is
documented as playing a significant role in the decline of common
law marriage.' 42 After the eradication of slavery, states were
concerned that miscegenation might become rampant if common law
marriage were permitted, as non-licensed marriages could be a
means of circumventing statutory prohibitions on performing
interracial marriages. 4 3 In response to this concern, many U.S.
states both explicitly prohibited miscegenation and banned common
law marriage at the end of the nineteenth century and the early
part of the twentieth century.'4 4 In Virginia, common law marriage
was officially declared to be against the public policy by the Virginia
Supreme Court in 1902;... and the Commonwealth reified its

138. See id. at 546-47 (citing a Mississippi court's discussion of the importance of
marriage).
139. Id. at 550.
140. See id. at 553-63.
141. See Bowman, supra note 94, at 731-49; Lindsay, supra note 134, at 553-77; see also
Ariela R. Dubler, Note, Governing Through Contract: Common Law Marriage in the
Nineteenth Century, 107 YALE L.J. 1885, 1903-05 (1998).
142. Bowman, supranote 94, at 737-39.
143. See id.

144. See id. (stating that by 1916, twenty-eight states and territories had passed laws
prohibiting miscegenation).
145. See Offield v. Davis, 40 S.E. 910, 913-14 (Va. 1902).
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longstanding anti-miscegenation policy by strengthening the
wording of the statute in 1924.146
The eugenics movement, which was closely related to the wave of
anti-miscegenation statutes both temporally and ideologically, was
concerned with "national hereditary fitness"; 147 that is, it sought to
use the state as a mechanism to create and perpetuate an ideal race
of people. 148 As marriage was the key way for the state to control
reproduction, the goals of the eugenics movement could be furthered
by carefully restricting and controlling who could marry. 149 Because
common law marriage allowed citizens to marry-and therefore
reproduce-without state involvement, proponents of the eugenics
movement found common law marriage to be inimical to their goals
of biological fitness. 5 ° Supporters of eugenics also tended to view
the emerging poverty associated with industrialization as a
behavioral problem and not an economic crisis.' 5 ' Thus, they
thought the evils of poverty could be controlled by carefully
unsound"'15 2
regulating marriage and preventing the "biologically
1 53
from marrying and, presumably, procreating.
A third major nationwide concern about common law marriage
was the fear of false claims on inheritance and government
benefits.' After widows' benefits became more substantial in the
wake of World War I, one official in the Veterans' Bureau became
"violently opposed to common law marriage" because he feared it
might create "an immense administrative burden, as government

146. See Walter Wadlington, The Loving Case: Virginia's Anti-miscegenation Statute in
HistoricalPerspective, 52 VA. L. REV. 1189, 1200-01 (1966) (citing Va. Acts of Assembly 1924,
ch. 371).
147. See Lindsay, supra note 134, at 565, 571.
148. Id. at 563-72.
149. See id. at 564-66, 570-71.
150. See id. at 570-71.
151. Id. at 554.
152. Id. at 571.
153. Id. at 555 (speculating that "by locating the causes of society's crisis of pauperism in
families themselves, rather than in the nature of industrial wage relations, reformers and
policymakers who were invested in the idea of the nation's continued economic growth could
maintain that the remedy for dependency lay not in state regulation of the economy but
rather in the moral and behavioral reconstruction of one of the most conspicuous and
disturbing symbols of social disintegration-the faltering family").
154. Bowman, supranote 94, at 741-43, 746-48.

996

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:973

agencies [would be] required to sort through numerous claims" of
common law marriage in order to award benefits. 5 '
In the modern day, the criticisms that led to the demise of
common law marriage in many U.S. states, including Virginia, are
considered to be unconstitutional, morally unsound, or generally
unfounded.'5 6 The Supreme Court declared anti-miscegenation
statutes to be unconstitutional in the landmark case of Loving v.
Virginia,'17 and the eugenics movement is no longer a relevant
social force.' Any attempt to implement a public policy based on
race-based considerations or genetic engineering would be morally
repugnant and run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.'5 9
Although concerns about burdening the courts and administrative
bureaucracies with false claims are still a legitimate consideration,
the data indicate that these concerns are far from prohibitively
burdensome. In the common law marriage state of Georgia, a study
revealed that from 1955 to 1983, the state's appellate courts dealt
with resolving common law marriage disputes an average of only
four times per year.'
The Supreme Court of Nebraska, while
asserting that it was widely known that common law marriage
frequently resulted in false claims and fraud, was unable to cite a
single case of fraud or injustice in that state stemming from a
common law marriage case.' Although the threat of fraud and false
claims does inhere in a common law regime, such negatives must be
balanced against the many benefits of giving social and legal
recognition to unmarried cohabiters.'6 2
Today, only eleven states and the nation's capital use the doctrine
of common law marriage to confer the rights and responsibilities of
marriage onto couples who have not been formally married.'6 3 In
spite of the fact that nonmarital cohabitation is an inherently
155. Id. at 746-47.
156. See generally Bowman, supranote 94; Lindsay, supranote 134.
157. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
158. See Lindsay, supra note 134, at 563-77 (discussing the eugenics movement as a
phenomenon of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries).
159. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 11-12.
160. Bowman, supra note 94, at 752.
161. Id. at 741 (citation omitted).
162. See supra Part I.C.
163. See supra note 109. As previously mentioned, Virginia is not one of them.
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unstable arrangement, the number of nonmarital cohabitations is
on the rise. As more children are born each year to unmarried
cohabiters, Virginia has instituted the clear policy of constitutionally prohibiting any legal recognition-and therefore regulation-of
cohabitations analogous to marriage.16 4
The reality of the current social and political situation in Virginia
makes common law marriage the ideal public policy solution to the
problem of nonmarital cohabitation. Common law marriage is a
recognized, historic American legal doctrine; it avoids the problem
of having to come up with alternative schemes for marriage, such as
civil unions and domestic partnerships; and, best of all, it is simple.
If adopted, couples in Virginia would be on notice that, if they enter
into a cohabitation analogous to marriage, the state will dispense
with the analogies and simply treat them as married.
The only difficulty in implementing common law marriage, as it
has traditionally existed in America, is that very few contemporary
cohabitating couples would meet all the elements necessary to
successfully achieve a common law marriage. Although modern day
couples who cohabit but do not marry can easily meet the requirements of consent and assumption of marital duties by cohabiting
and consummating their relationships,'6 5 not many cohabiting
couples hold themselves out to their communities to be married
couples. Since the mass abandonment of common law marriage a
century ago, social expectations and presumptions have changed.
Because society no longer expects cohabiting men and women to be
married, most modern unmarried cohabiters do not hold themselves
out to be married or make an express declaration to each other that
they are married.'6 6
The state's interests in regulating nonmarital cohabitation exist
regardless of whether the couple has made an express declaration
of marriage. 6 7 If the substance of the relationship is that of
marriage, then the relationship should be governed and regulated
by marriage laws and norms. Yet, if the "holding out" requirement
164. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
165. See supra text accompanying note 132.
166. WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 8, at 36 (noting that "as the moral prohibition
against premarital sex weakened and more unmarried men and women began to conduct
active sex lives openly, the stigma of living together also weakened").
167. See Caudill, supra note 7, at 565.
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of common law marriage were to be adopted, then the doctrine
would be unavailable to many of the cohabiters whose relationships
the state has an interest in regulating.
Professor David S. Caudill has proposed a sensible modification
to the "holding out" requirement of common law marriage that
would preserve the intent and function of common law marriage
while adapting it to the reality of modern nonmarital cohabitation.16 Instead of the bright-line rule requiring a clear "holding out"
that the couple is married, a test would be used to establish whether
the couple's relationship has objectively adopted the key characteristics of marriage.'6 9 In practice, this test would be used instead of
the third element of traditional common law marriage-the "holding
out" requirement. In order to "ascertain the essence of [the] social
17 of marriage,
structure""
the test would inquire whether the couple:
(1) attained economic interdependence and divided domestic
functions; and
(2) made representations to the community that they were a
committed pair; such representations could include declarations of exclusivity and commitment, having children, purchasing a home or other property, or claiming that they are in fact
married.'7 1
Professor Caudill has also suggested that the modern incarnation
of common law marriage should take legal effect only after all three
elements of common law marriage have been met continuously for
some period of time, such as two years.'7 2 This time requirement is
a practical compromise that recognizes the simple truth that
sometimes people make mistakes in their relationship decisions,
and it allows unmarried cohabiters up to twenty-four months to
evaluate their decision to live together, and, if necessary, to dissolve
the relationship without having to deal with the encumbrances of
divorce. At the same time, it would prevent couples from entering
into nonmarital cohabitation for longer than two years. 7 3
168. See id. at 567-68.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 568.
171. See id.

172. Id. Such a presumption should only be rebuttable by an express contract, indicating
an intent not to be married. Id.
173. See id.
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Using this modified form of common law marriage, the state
would convert nonmarital cohabitation into traditional marriage
when these elements are met continuously for two years: (1)
consent; (2) cohabitation; and (3) satisfaction of the two-part
objective test of marriage characteristics. 174 Couples engaged in
nonmarital cohabitations lasting two years or longer would be
prevented from denying that they were married, unless they had an
express written contract to the contrary. This variation on common
1 75
law marriage uses the well-established legal concept of estoppe
to confer recognition and rights to committed cohabiters. This is
constructive marriage.

III. CONSTRUCTIVE MARRIAGE IN VIRGINIA
Theoretically, constructive marriage is an excellent solution to the
problem of nonmarital cohabitation in Virginia. It would give status,
rights, and recognition to couples who are in relationships analogous to marriage; it would foster stability and long-range planning
for couples who consider cohabitation; it would provide a just means
for dispute resolution when these relationships end; and it would
give structure and guidance to couples and families who are
unwilling to impose it upon themselves. In practice, however, such
a policy would need to be consistent with Virginia's theories of law
and articulated public policy to be successfully implemented. An
examination of key Virginia court cases and statutes reveals that in
spite of the statutory proscription on common law marriage, much
of Virginia law does in fact comport with the approach of constructive marriage. Furthermore, in light of the recent changes to the
Virginia Constitution, now is the perfect time for the Commonwealth to adopt constructive marriage.

174. See id. at 564.
175. Tennessee is the only U.S. state to have "marriage by estoppel," but its application has
been limited to a very narrow set of circumstances. Bowman, supra note 94, at 771-72.
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A. The Legacy of Offield v. Davis
7 6 the Supreme Court of Virginia declared that
In Offield v. Davis,"
common law marriage was unlawful in the Commonwealth. 77 The
court stated:

We are ... of opinion that the enactment of [an 1849] statute

wholly abrogated the common law in force in this state on the
subject of marriages, and that no marriage or attempted
marriage, if it took place in this state, can be held valid here
unless it has been shown to have been
under a license, and
178
solemnized according to our statutes.
Since the holding in Offield, courts have consistently held that
common law marriage is not recognized in Virginia.' 7 9 In keeping
with the holding of Offield and its progeny, a license is now
statutorily required for any marriage in the Commonwealth to be
18
valid. 0
The public policy disfavoring common law marriage that was
articulated in Offield, however, no longer makes sense in Virginia.
Offield cites no specific Virginia policy against common law
marriage aside from a general disdain for unions that are formed

176. 40 S.E. 910 (Va. 1902).
177. Id. at 914. The court relayed the history of statutes imposing punishment on persons
who officiate wedding ceremonies without the proper licensing, tracing the history of common
law marriage back to seventeenth century British law. The court then noted a comment on
the 1849 revision of the Virginia Code, saying:
It appears quite significant, we think, that [the provision punishing unlicensed
wedding officiators] was ingrafted upon the statute at the suggestion of the
revisers of the Code of 1849. In a note to their report (Report of Revisers, 1849,
p. 558), they recommended that whatever might be the regulations prescribed
as to the mode of solemnizing marriages, or the penalty affixed for the offense
of solemnizing a marriage without lawful authority, a license should be required
in all cases. Manifestly it was their view that with this provision in the statute
there could be no valid marriage in Virginia entered into without the license
required by law.
Id. at 910-11.
178. Id. at 914.
179. See Kasey v. Richardson, 331 F. Supp 580 (W.D. Va. 1971); Newsom v. Fleming, 181
S.E. 393 (Va. 1935); Vanderpool v. Ryan, 119 S.E. 65, 66 (Va. 1923); Reynolds v. Adams, 99
S.E. 695 (Va. 1919); Reynolds v. Reynolds, 62 Va. Cir. 114, 118 (Cir. Ct. 2003).
180. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-13 (2007).
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outside the control of the state.' Although the intended effect of
discouraging nonmarital cohabitation may have resulted at the time
of Offield, contemporary society no longer charges that such unions
are "revolting to the sense of enlightened society."'8 2 Denying
unmarried cohabiters a legal status no longer dissuades them from
living together, but it does allow them to operate outside the laws
and norms that effectively regulate the institution of marriage.'8 3
Thus, the only legitimate policy goal mentioned in Offield v.
Davis-thatof discouraging nonmarital cohabitation-is no longer
served by a ban on common law marriage.
Although a change in statute would be necessary to allow for
constructive marriage, that statutory revision would not dramatically alter the current public policy of Virginia; it would simply
update the regulatory scheme to address the realities of contemporary Virginia relationships.
B. Virginia's Take on Cohabitation
In spite of the holding in Offield, Virginia has in fact carved out
exceptions for nonmarital cohabitation and granted it some special
legal status. The movement of the courts and the legislature
toward identifying and regulating nonmarital cohabitation is a
step in the direction of constructive marriage, not away from it.
Cohabitation is not a legal non-entity in Virginia; it is a recognized
union'8 4 with uncertain legal status. For example, in McClaugherty
v. McClaugherty, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the
children of unrecognized common law marriages are legitimate. 5
In Rickman v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia held
that unmarried cohabiters had a unique enough relationship to fall
under the scope of domestic violence statutes, which impose higher
penalties than ordinary assaults.'86 In Frey v. Frey, the Court of
Appeals of Virginia described nonmarital cohabitation as "analogous
181.
182.
marks
183.
184.
185.
186.

See Offield, 40 S.E. at 913.
Id. (quoting In re Estate of McLaughlin, 30 P. 651 (Wash. 1892) (internal quotation
omitted)); see WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 8, at 36-37.
See Caudill, supra note 7, at 539-40.
See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
See 21 S.E.2d 761, 766-67 (Va. 1942).
See 535 S.E.2d 187, 187-92 (Va. Ct. App. 2000).
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to a marriage."'8 7 In Schweider v. Schweider, the Virginia Supreme
Court also found that, within the context of a private alimony
contract, the defendant had "remarried" even though she only
cohabitated with her new companion.'
Following the holding in Schweider, a Virginia statutory amendment was passed in 1997 providing that, upon an alimony payee's
cohabitation with another person, the payor's obligation of spousal
support is terminated.'8 9 Within this context, the courts have
explicitly stated that cohabitation is the equivalent of marriage.
Under the 1997 statute, "[for spousal support to survive cohabitation, there must be an express provision to that effect, not one
presumed by inference."'9 ° The underlying assumption-that nonmarital cohabitation is essentially the same as marriage-is the
same policy rationale that supports the constructive marriage
doctrine.
The elements of nonmarital cohabitation as defined by the
Supreme Court of Virginia also coincide with the objective test for
determining a constructive marriage.' 9 ' The Court of Appeals of
Virginia has declared that cohabitation is analogous to marriage
when the unmarried couple assumes "marital duties."'9 2 The
Virginia courts have not articulated specifically which marital
duties and responsibilities make a cohabitation analogous to
marriage. The objective test of constructive marriage simply takes
the next step by looking to the two key factors in a marital
relationship-interdependence and representations of commitment-as the quintessential marital duties. As such, adoption of
constructive marriage in Virginia would not even require a change
in the way the courts analyze the relationships; it would merely
provide statutory guidelines to make it easier for the courts to
determine whether a cohabitation is analogous to marriage and,
therefore, a constructive marriage.

187. 416 S.E.2d 40, 43 (Va. Ct. App. 1992).
188. 415 S.E.2d 135, 138 (Va. 1992).
189. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-109 (2007).
190. Biddle v. Biddle, 46 Va. Cir. 433, 434 (Cir. Ct. 1998).
191. See supra notes 52, 168-72 and accompanying text.
192. See Rickman v. Commonwealth, 535 S.E.2d 187, 190 (Va. Ct. App. 2000) (quoting Frey
v. Frey, 416 S.E.2d at 43).
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Adoption of constructive marriage would not only be consistent
with the 2006 marriage amendment to the Virginia Constitution,
but it would also prevent Virginia citizens from losing existing
common law and statutory rights that are not consistent with the
amendment. The Virginia amendment seeks to prevent a dual
system that recognizes both marriage and other institutions that
approximate, but are distinctly not, marriage.19 3 By adopting
constructive marriage, which converts nonmarital cohabitation
into full-fledged marriage, Virginia could expand accessibility to
marriage while preventing cohabitation arrangements from
competing with the institution of marriage. Without constructive
marriage, the 2006 constitutional prohibition on recognizing any
unions that approximate marriage could undermine the special
status that Virginia courts and statutes have conferred upon
nonmarital cohabitation. As it stands now, unmarried cohabiters
may lose their rights to press charges under domestic violence
statutes, their children may become illegitimate, and payors of
alimony might have to continue spousal support even if their former
spouses enter into long-term nonmarital cohabitation with a new
partner.19 Adopting constructive marriage not only would ensure
that the current limited rights and privileges afforded to unmarried
cohabiters are maintained, but it would also greatly expand their
rights by converting their cohabitations into marriages.
C. Current Virginia Recognition of Common Law Marriage
Despite the articulated hostility toward common law marriage,
Virginia actually does recognize some common law unions.
Unlicensed marriages of couples who move to Virginia from common
law states, as well as common law marriages of Virginia couples
who simply travel to a state that recognizes common law marriage,
are recognized in Virginia.'9 5 In the case of Chapman v. Graninger,
the court held that a seventeen-year-old bride and twenty-twoyear-old groom had been married at common law in Washington,
193. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 185-88 and accompanying text.
195. See Reynolds v. Reynolds, 62 Va. Cir. 114, 118 (Cir. Ct. 2003) ("Virginia does recognize
as valid a common law marriage formed in accordance with the law of another state which
recognizes common law marriage as valid.").
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D.C.' 96 when they "exchang[ed] vows in front of the Washington
Monument" and then spent one night together in the District of
1 9 v This
Columbia, followed by a two-week cohabitation in Virginia.
ruling came in spite of Virginia's requirement of parental consent198to
marriage for persons between the ages of sixteen and eighteen.
Recognition of some, but not all, common law marriages brings
into question the frequent assertion that common law marriage is
contrary to the public policy of Virginia.'9 9 This uneven policy clearly
favors couples who have the means or foresight to travel; unmarried
cohabiters who vacation in Washington, D.C., or Dallas, for
instance, would be given the full legal recognition and status of
marriage, but their counterparts who do not have the time, means,
or inclination to travel would be left without legal recourse in the
event that they separate. °0
D. Creating the Ties that Bind
Another way in which Virginia law is in line with the approach
of constructive marriage is in the area of imposing legal duties
on parties based on their behavior. Although Virginia has never
officially adopted promissory estoppel into its common law of
contracts,2 1 it does recognize and apply equitable estoppel. °2 As a
state that has adopted the Uniform Partnership Act,20 3 Virginia will
also recognize a business partnership if the substance of a partner-

196. 6 Va. Cir. 234, 234 (Cir. Ct. 1985).
197. Id. at 234-35.
198. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-48 to -49 (2007) (setting the minimum age at sixteen and the
maximum age at eighteen). Interestingly, in weighing the public policy interests at stake in
this case, the Virginia court chose to recognize common law marriage-a union that is
supposedly against Virginia's public policy-over the public policy that is clearly articulated
in the Virginia Code.
199. See supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text.
200. See Reynolds, 62 Va. Cir. at 118.
201. See, e.g., Guzy v. Hoban, 43 Va. Cir. 33, 36 (Cir. Ct. 1997) ("The doctrine of promissory
estoppel has not been applied in Virginia, and the Supreme Court of Virginia has never
officially adopted the doctrine of promissory estoppel as part of Virginia's common law."
(citation omitted)).
202. See, e.g., NPA v. WBA, 380 S.E.2d 178, 182 (Va. Ct. App. 1989) (applying equitable
estoppel to the child support context).
203. See Virginia Uniform Partnership Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 50-73.79 to .150 (2007).
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ship is proven, even if no express contract exists. 2 4 Both doctrines-equitable estoppel and implied partnership-are analogous
to constructive marriage in both theory and application.
1. EquitableEstoppel

The elements of equitable estoppel, as applied in Virginia, are: (1)
the making of a representation, (2) a party's reliance upon that
representation, (3) the changing of a party's position, (4) to her
detriment. °5 The theory of constructive marriage is built upon
similar theoretical underpinnings. When a couple cohabits,
commingles their assets, and divides domestic responsibilities,
reliance and change of position are not only inevitable; they are
necessary to the successful functioning of the relationship.2 6
Constructive marriage and equitable estoppel both look to verbal
assertions and actions as evidence of reliance and change of position.20 7 Although equitable estoppel requires a showing of detriment,
constructive marriage has no direct requirement of detriment.
Cohabitation and commingling, however, are actions of compromise;
every time a couple compromises, each party sacrifices for the
success of the pair. Certainly in the divorce context, either or both
parties would be able to show some sacrifice as "detriment. 20 8
204. See Cooper v. Spencer, 238 S.E.2d 805, 806-07 (Va. 1977) (finding a partnership
existed even though an express contract was not signed).
205. See NPA, 380 S.E.2d at 182.
206. See the discussion on exchange-based relationships and corresponding relationship
instability, supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text. Although cohabitations tend to take on
characteristics of less dependent exchange relationships, some degree of economic and
domestic interdependence is often inevitable. See Kandoian, supra note 32, at 1867-68. One
of the express goals of constructive marriage, in fact, is to encourage cohabiting couples to
engage in the more stable and beneficial union of marriage, as opposed to the halfway solution
of cohabitation. "[M]inimal evidence of ... interdependence" would be required to satisfy the
first part of the objective relationship test for constructive marriage. See Caudill, supra note
7, at 567. If a cohabitation, however, were to take on no characteristics of domestic or
economic interdependence, then the relationship would not be either a constructive marriage
or a "cohabitation analogous to marriage" under current Virginia law. See supra notes 51-52
and accompanying text.
207. Compare Tanson v. Radulescu, 34 Va. Cir. 181, 185 (Cir. Ct. 1994) (holding that the
wife's "statements, conduct, [and] actions" estopped her from asserting non-paternity), with
the objective relationship test for constructive marriage, supra notes 169-72 and
accompanying text.
208. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-109 (2007) (listing statutory grounds for a claim of spousal
support in a divorce action).
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Virginia courts have applied the doctrine of estoppel to intimate
familial relationships. In the case of Tanson v. Radulescu, the court
first noted that, "the doctrine of estoppel should be applied cautiously and only when equity clearly requires it to be done."2 °9 Yet
the court went on to find just such an equitable requirement in a
family relationship. In this case, a mother was estopped from
pleading non-paternity in a custody conflict with her ex-husband,
who was not the child's biological or adoptive father: ' Defendant]
encouraged the relationship between [complainant] and [her son].
Her statements, conduct, actions, and behavior fostered a father-son
relationship between the two. [Complainant] relied upon her
position and representations and became a father to this child.
[Defendant] must be estopped from now changing her position. 21 °
In the case of NPA v. WBA, the Virginia court also speculated that
justifying child support of a non-biological child on a theory of
estoppel was possible.2 1 ' Finally, in T v. T,2" 2 a case in which a
husband wanted to invoke the statute of frauds to invalidate an
implied agreement he had made with his wife, the court made this
telling declaration: "We believe that the husband's promises to the
wife, in reliance upon which she changed her position, acted to her
detriment, and substantially performed her obligations until her
husband made further performance impossible, have estopped him
from pleading the statute of frauds."21' 3
2. Doctrineof Implied Partnership
The doctrine of implied partnership is another close analog to
constructive marriage. In Virginia, an implied partnership will be
found when one party can show enough evidence to convince the
court that a partnership did exist, even in the absence of a
contract.2 14 In a suit to establish an implied business partnership,
the court will look to see if the relationship had enough "indicia" of

209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

34 Va. Cir. 181, 184 (Cir. Ct. 1994) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 185.
380 S.E.2d 178, 182 (Va. Ct. App. 1989).
224 S.E.2d 148 (Va.1976).
Id. at 152.
See Cooper v. Spencer, 238 S.E.2d 805, 806 (Va. 1977).
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a partnership to be classified as a partnership.1 5 If an implied
partnership is found, then the court will impute to the relationship
all the legal duties and obligations of partnership law.21 6 The
doctrine of implied partnership is even more similar to constructive
marriage than equitable estoppel because, with implied partnership, the court can impute a whole host of duties, obligations, and
rights when the status of partnership is declared, as opposed to a
single duty or obligation that is found (or prohibited) in the case of
estoppel.
Much like in an implied partnership, when the objective test for
constructive marriage finds sufficient "indicia" of a marriage in the
form of representations of commitment and economic and domestic
interdependence, a marriage would be found. 1 7 The court would
impute to the relationship all the obligations and duties of marriage, just as it would under current Virginia partnership law.
So similar are the doctrines of partnership and marriage that in
the instance of a divorcing couple also dissolving a jointly held
partnership, Virginia courts currently will allow all the partnership
and marital assets to be consolidated and distributed in a single
action.2 1
The theme that emerges from Virginia's use and acceptance of
both equitable estoppel and the doctrine of implied partnership is
that Virginia will impute legal duties, rights, and obligations to
individuals based upon their actions and assertions that indicate
they have impliedly consented to those rights, duties, and obligations. This is an important response to the inevitable outcry that
constructive marriage would be excessively intrusive on American
conceptions of liberty and autonomy.219 Although constructive
marriage in a very real sense would restrict the liberty of couples to
do whatever they like in intimate relationships, countless laws
215. Id. at 806-07.
216. See id. at 806.
217. See supra notes 169-72 and accompanying text.
218. See Epperson v. Epperson, 15 Va. Cir. 39, 53-54 (Cir. Ct. 1988). Note that if the
Eppersons had not been married but had merely cohabited, the consolidation of their assets
would not have been possible, as there would have been no "marital property."
219. For a critique of constructive marriage's imposition on personal liberty and autonomy,
see Marsha Garrison, Is Consent Necessary? An Evaluation of the Emerging Law of
Cohabitant Obligation,52 UCLA L. REV. 815,834-38 (2005) (classifying constructive marriage
as "conscriptive").
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already exist that restrict the ways in which relationships can be
conducted.2 2 ° Constructive marriage simply requires that couples
who engage in cohabitations analogous to marriage adhere to the
same duties and obligations-and receive the same rights-as their
married counterparts. To the extent that the state's adoption of
constructive marriage limits personal autonomy, it does so in the
same way that the state's lawful regulation of marriage limits
personal autonomy: in the name of justice and for the mutual
benefit of society, the state, and the couples themselves.
E. Implications for Same-sex Relationships
Adopting a policy of constructive marriage in Virginia would also
serve to highlight the inconsistency in the two clauses of the 2006
marriage amendment to the Virginia Constitution. The first clause
prohibits same-sex marriage, whereas the second clause expresses
a public policy that favors marriage over the less stable and far less
beneficial alternative of nonmarital cohabitation.22 1 Opponents of
the amendment encouraged voters to read the entire text of the
amendment before voting;... yet an informed voter who valued the
stability of marriage and the justice inherent in the state's regulation of marriage, as compared to the relatively unstable and
completely unregulated arrangement of cohabitation, might easily
have voted in favor of the amendment, in spite of its illogical
exclusion of homosexuals from the myriad benefits of marriage.
The clause in the 2006 Virginia constitutional amendment that
excluded same-sex couples from marriage was an ideological non
sequitur. Same-sex couples would presumably reap the same
benefits of stability, social approval, and justice from marriage as
heterosexual couples do.223 Unfortunately, because of the constitutional ban on same-sex unions, and because of a prevailing social
norm that "marriage" is exclusively the union of a man and a
220. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-57.2 (2007) (forbidding domestic violence); § 18.2-61
(forbidding marital rape); § 18.2-362 (forbidding bigamy); § 18.2-365 (forbidding adultery).
221. See VA. CONST. art. I, § 15-A.
222. See Jenkins, supra note 2 ("Opponents of the measure ... focused their campaign on
the second and third lines of the ballot question, which read in part that Virginia would not
create a legal status for unmarried couples that sought to 'approximate ... the effects of
marriage."').
223. WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 8, at 200-01.
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woman, more hurdles must be overcome before Virginia is as
prepared to adopt same-sex marriage as it is to accommodate
constructive marriage. Adopting constructive marriage would serve
to focus Virginia policy on marriage as a status and not a mere
contract. This renewed focus on status would further the goal of
broadening access to the institution of marriage, not limiting it. In
this context, an extension of marriage to same-sex couples would be
a logical next step.
CONCLUSION

Renowned couples therapist Christopher Clulow once wrote that
"[i]t is precisely because private arrangements have social implications ... and because social systems have implications for the
arrangement of private life that marriage would have to be invented
if it did not already exist. ' As an institution, marriage both
informs the society in which it exists and is shaped and guided by
the social norms and attitudes that surround it. Marriage is not
simply what we make of it; it defines us as well.
In American society, marriage is an institution of profound
economic, social, legal, and moral significance. Cohabitation, by
most accounts, is a private arrangement that poorly approximates
marriage; it yields few of marriage's benefits but entails a host of
complications and negative externalities that pose a threat not only
to marriage but to the couples who choose cohabitation. Constructive marriage, if adopted in Virginia, would be an effective hedge to
the rising trend of cohabitation; it would encourage stability and
commitment in couples while furthering the goals of justice and fair
dealing in relationships.
The current public policy, statutes, and common law of Virginia
are well-suited to accommodate constructive marriage. Although the
statute requiring a license and solemnization for all marriages
would need to be revised in order to implement constructive
marriage,2 25 very little substantive law would need to be changed.
The Virginia courts have already established a working definition
224. Christopher Clulow, "Good-Enough"Marriage,in RETHINKING MARRIAGE: PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE PERSPECTIVES 123, 124 (Christopher Clulow ed., 1993).
225. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-13 (2007) (requiring that "[e]very marriage in [the]
Commonwealth [of Virginia] shall be under a license and solemnized").

1010

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:973

for nonmarital cohabitation and have applied that definition to
construe cohabitations in a variety of contexts.22 6 Constructive
marriage also is consistent with the policy aim of the 2006 marriage
amendment to the Virginia Constitution: it would not only help to
ensure that cohabiters do not lose rights under the amendment, but
it would also ensure that they gain all the rights and protections of
marriage. Although constructive marriage places some restrictions
on individual autonomy, these restrictions must be balanced with
all the benefits of adopting a constructive marriage regime and
viewed in the context of Virginia's willingness to impose legal duties
on parties who have impliedly consented to those duties through
actions and assertions. Constructive marriage is at once creative
and simple, progressive yet traditional, and innovative but consistent with current trends and policies in Virginia law.
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226. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text; Part III.B.
* J.D. Candidate 2008, William & Mary School of Law; B.S. 2002, United States Military
Academy. For his insightful commentary that has substantially improved this Note, I extend
sincere thanks to Jim Dwyer. I also wish to thank my parents, Bruce and Mary, for their
constant support and wisdom.

